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PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS 
AND SUBSTANTIVE EVIDENCE 
FEDERAL RULE 801(D)(1)(A):  THE COMPROMISE 
Stephen A. Saltzburg* 
INTRODUCTION 
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(A) is a compromise.  The Supreme 
Court’s version of the Rule, which it submitted to Congress in 1972, would 
have made all prior inconsistent statements of a witness present in court for 
cross-examination admissible as substantive evidence.  The Court’s 
proposal was strongly favored by the Advisory Committee on the Federal 
Rules of Evidence (or “the Advisory Committee”) members who drafted 
the Rule.  They submitted it to the Court1 knowing that it was consistent 
with the approach taken by some states2 and favored by authorities like 
John Henry Wigmore,3 Edmund Morgan,4 and Charles McCormick.5  But 
the Court’s proposal was a departure from the common law approach, 
which treated all prior inconsistent statements as hearsay, admissible only 
for impeachment.6  The compromise permits statements to be admitted 
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Criminal Justice Section.  With Professors Michael M. Martin and Daniel J. Capra, he 
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 1. See 4 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, MICHAEL M. MARTIN & DANIEL J. CAPRA, FEDERAL 
RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL § 801.04[1], at 801-304 (10th ed. 2011) [hereinafter EVIDENCE 
MANUAL]. 
 2. The Advisory Committee cited the California Evidence Code section 1235 and the 
Comment thereto. Id. 
 3. 3A JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1018, at 996 
(James H. Chadbourn ed., rev. ed. 1970).  Dean Wigmore earlier had a different view and 
supported the common law approach. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 251, at 432 (Kenneth 
S. Broun ed., 6th ed. 2006) (noting that Wigmore “originally adhered to the traditional 
view”). 
 4. Edmund M. Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 
62 HARV. L. REV. 177, 192–93 (1948). 
 5. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 3, § 251, at 431–32. 
 6. The Report of the House Committee on the Judiciary on the Federal Rules of 
Evidence stated that “[p]resent Federal law, except in the Second Circuit, permits the use of 
prior inconsistent statements of a witness for impeachment only.” EVIDENCE MANUAL, supra 
note 1, § 801.04[4], at 801-309.  The Second Circuit approach in United States v. De Sisto, 
329 F.2d 929, 933 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 979 (1964), permitted statements 
made under oath to be admitted as substantive evidence “where the prior statements were 
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when the declarant is present in court for cross-examination and the prior 
statement “is inconsistent with the declarant’s testimony and was given 
under penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding or in a 
deposition.”7 
I.  THE ARGUMENT FOR SUBSTANTIVE ADMISSIBILITY 
The original Advisory Committee quoted the Comment to California 
Evidence Code section 1235 and endorsed its reasoning: 
 Section 1235 admits inconsistent statements of witnesses because the 
dangers against which the hearsay rule is designed to protect are largely 
nonexistent.  The declarant is in court and may be examined and cross-
examined in regard to his statements and their subject matter. . . .  The 
trier of fact has the declarant before it and can observe his demeanor and 
the nature of his testimony as he denies or tries to explain away the 
inconsistency. . . .  Moreover, [s]ection 1235 will provide a party with 
desirable protection against the “turncoat” witness who changes his story 
on the stand and deprives the party calling him of evidence essential to his 
case.8 
The original Advisory Committee added its own thought that “the 
requirement that the statement be inconsistent with the testimony given 
assures a thorough exploration of both versions while the witness is on the 
stand and bars any general and indiscriminate use of previously prepared 
statements.”9 
One other argument made in favor of the California approach is that 
“[t]he prior statement is always nearer and usually very much nearer to the 
event than is the testimony.”10  This argument strikes me as wrong on 
several levels.  First, there is no empirical evidence as to when prior 
statements are made.  When a crime is not solved for months or years, prior 
statements might well be made long after underlying events and not very 
long before trial.  Second, we know that memory fades very quickly so that 
a few days after an event memory problems may arise.11  Third, we have 
 
themselves testimony before a grand jury or at a former trial or were adopted by such 
testimony.” Id. 
 7. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A). 
 8. EVIDENCE MANUAL, supra note 1, § 801.04[1], at 801-304 (citing CAL. EVID. CODE 
§ 1235 cmt.). 
 9. Id. at 801-304 to -305.  Apparently this was a response to a concern that “a practice 
might develop among lawyers whereby a carefully prepared statement would be offered in 
lieu of testimony, merely tendering the witness for cross-examination on the statement.” 
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 3, § 251, at 432. 
 10. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 3, § 251, at 432; see also Report of the Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary, reprinted in EVIDENCE MANUAL, supra note 1, § 801.04[5], at 
801-313 to -317. 
 11. 2 JOHN W. STRONG, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 281, at 243 (5th ed. 1999) (noting 
that psychological research suggests “that a rapid rate of memory loss occurs within the first 
two or three days following the observation of an event” (emphasis added)); see also How 
Quickly We Forget:  The Transience of Memory, PSYBLOG (Jan. 22, 2008), http:// 
www.spring.org.uk/2008/01/how-quickly-we-forget-transience-of.php (“[W]e lose a lot of 
information soon after it goes in, then, over time, the rate of forgetting slows down.”) 
[perma.cc/G8SF-E64T]. 
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hearsay exceptions for present sense impressions,12 excited utterances,13 
and prior recollection recorded,14 which deal with many “recent” 
statements.15  Fourth, many witnesses review records and refresh 
recollection before trials so that their total recall of events might well 
exceed recall at the time that an informal statement is made. 
II.  THE FEDERAL COMPROMISE 
The coauthor of my treatise, Professor Daniel J. Capra, who is also the 
Reporter to the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
criticized the compromise enacted by Congress in the following passage: 
 The requirements imposed by Congress in Rule 801(d)(1)(A) have 
little to do with the concerns that are at the heart of the hearsay rule.  First, 
while the requirement of a formal proceeding tends to alleviate concern 
over whether the prior inconsistent statement was ever made, that concern 
has nothing to do with the hearsay rule.  The making of the statement (as 
distinguished from its truth) is a question addressed by in-court testimony:  
the in-court witness testifies that the statement was or was not made, and 
this becomes a jury question.  Second, the requirements of oath and 
formality do little to guarantee the reliability of the prior out-of-court 
statement.  The whole basis for reliability of these statements is that the 
declarant is the same person as the witness who is testifying under oath at 
the time of trial, and can therefore be cross-examined about the prior 
statement.  That reliability guarantee is not dependent on the 
circumstances under which the out-of-court statement was made.  Thus, 
the limitations imposed by Congress do not seem to mesh very well with 
the concerns expressed. 
 However, while the Advisory Committee’s proposal has a stronger 
basis in the theory of the hearsay rule, the fact remains that it is not the 
law.16 
I respectfully disagree and assert that the common law rule has a stronger 
basis in the theory of the hearsay rule than admitting all prior inconsistent 
statements for their truth.  Indeed, I go further and maintain that there is 
only one situation in which prior inconsistent statements not made under 
oath in a proceeding should be admitted for their truth. 
III.  THREE RATIONALES FOR HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS 
AND PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS 
My thesis, set forth in a separate Article in this issue,17 is that there are 
three rationales for hearsay exceptions:  reliability, necessity, and 
 
 12. FED. R. EVID. 803(1). 
 13. Id. 803(2). 
 14. Id. 803(5). 
 15. These also raise questions, as my other Article in this issue discusses.  See Stephen 
A. Saltzburg, Rethinking the Rationale(s) for Hearsay Exceptions, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1485 (2016). 
 16. Advisory Committee Notes to the Federal Rules of Evidence That May Require 
Clarification, 182 F.R.D. 268, 282 (1999), reprinted in EVIDENCE MANUAL, supra note 1, 
§ 801.04[2], at 801-308 to -309 [hereinafter Capra Note]. 
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substantial foundation.  In that Article, I examine the federal hearsay 
exceptions and identify one or more rationales underlying each exception.  I 
contend here that a proper application of these rationales supports the 
compromise approach found in Rule 801(d)(1)(A).  But, before examining 
the compromise, I want to explain the rationale for the common law rule 
and why it remains persuasive in most scenarios. 
A.  Starting Point:  An Unreliable Witness 
A judge or jury called upon to assess the credibility of a witness should 
be able to consider the fact that the witness has made inconsistent 
statements in deciding whether trial testimony is false or mistaken.  If the 
jury believes the trial testimony despite the fact that the witness might have 
contradicted herself, the contradiction is treated like any other mistake a 
witness might make—i.e., an imperfection that might be expected of 
ordinary people.  But, when a judge or jury decides that it does not believe 
the witness’s trial testimony, the decision is a judgment that the witness is 
unreliable or lacks credibility.  In such a circumstance, the natural question 
to ask is:  Why would we want the judge or jury to treat as true an out-of-
court statement by the witness whose in-court testimony is not believable?  
My answer is that we wouldn’t—except in the single situation that I discuss 
below.  Before turning to that one, I want to discuss one scenario in which it 
does not matter whether a prior inconsistent statement is admitted as 
substantive evidence or solely for impeachment. 
1.  The Sole Goal Is Disbelief of the Trial Testimony 
Suppose that the government charges a defendant with bank robbery and 
offers the testimony of Cooperating Witness.  Cooperating Witness testifies, 
“I robbed the bank with the defendant” and proceeds to offer details about 
the planning and execution of the robbery.  When first interviewed by the 
FBI, Cooperating Witness said, “I had nothing to do with the bank 
robbery.”  In such a case, either the witness’s trial testimony or the prior 
statement must be true:  the witness either participated in the bank robbery 
or he didn’t.  Whenever a witness testifies to a fact and a prior statement 
repudiates that very fact, the trier of fact must choose to believe or 
disbelieve the fact.  If the trier of fact disbelieves the trial testimony, it 
believes the prior statement.  If it disbelieves the witness about a fact, it 
concludes that the fact is untrue.  It really does not matter whether the 
rejection of the testimony is attributable to a prior inconsistent statement or 
some other flaw in the testimony. 
In this scenario, it actually makes no difference whether the prior 
inconsistent statement is admitted solely for impeachment or as substantive 
evidence.  The reason is that the prosecution bears the burden of persuasion, 
and the defense wins the battle of the witness (and perhaps the case) by 
persuading the trier of fact to reject the witness’s testimony.  Because the 
 
 17. See Saltzburg, supra note 15. 
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defense bears no burden of persuasion, the prior inconsistent statement is 
not needed to make an affirmative case. 
2.  The One Example in Which Substantive Use 
Should Be Permissible 
Imagine that the government calls a witness to testify in an antitrust 
price-fixing case brought against seven individual defendants.  The witness 
is an administrative assistant to one of the defendants.  During direct 
testimony, the witness states that all of the meetings among the defendants 
amounted to no more than social interactions, that there was never a 
meeting in which all seven defendants were present, and that at no time 
were prices discussed.  The government has an FBI agent available to 
testify that in a lengthy interview the witness said that there were eight 
meetings in which prices were discussed and that four of the defendants 
were present at all the meetings, that the other three were present at seven 
of the eight meetings, and that all of them discussed prices.  Imagine further 
that the following examination occurs as the prosecutor (P) asks the witness 
(W) questions: 
P:  Do you remember speaking with FBI Agent Jones about a year ago? 
W: Yes, I do. 
P:  Would you agree that you spoke to her at some length? 
W: I would. 
P:  Now, during that interview, did you tell the Agent that there were  
   eight meetings in which prices were discussed? 
W: I did. 
P:  Why, then, do you now claim that there were no such meetings? 
W: The agent scared me.  She showed me a list of meetings and said,  
   “These were the meetings when prices were discussed, right?”  I  
   hesitated to answer, and she told me that it is a crime to lie to a  
   federal agent.  So I said “yes” about the meetings. 
P:  You now claim that what you said to the agent was untrue? 
W: Yes, she scared me. 
P:  Did you tell the agent that four of the defendants were present at all  
   of the meetings? 
W: I just agreed with her statement that four were present at the  
   meetings.  I wasn’t even sure that there were meetings on the days  
   on her list. 
P:  Did you tell the agent that three defendants were present at seven of  
   the eight meetings? 
W: Same answer.  I just agreed with what she said. 
P:  And did you tell the agent that they all discussed prices? 
W: Yes.  That was what she wanted to hear. 
P:  You could have told Agent Jones that you wanted to check your  
   calendar before answering, right? 
W: I could have, but she didn’t seem too patient. 
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P:  Your testimony today is that you lied about these defendants just  
   because you were scared? 
W: That’s right. 
P:  Didn’t Agent Jones show you her notes before you left the  
   interview? 
W: She did. 
P:  Did she ask you whether she had accurately summarized what you  
   said? 
W: She did. 
P:  You still work for one of the defendants as an administrative  
   assistant? 
W: Yes. 
P:  A job you have had for twelve-and-a-half years? 
W: Yes. 
P:  It’s a job you don’t want to lose? 
W: That’s true. 
P:  You don’t want to do something that might put your job at risk? 
W: That’s also true. 
In this scenario, the witness admits to making prior statements, testifies 
as to why they were made, and repudiates them in trial testimony.  The trier 
of fact should be as readily able to decide whether to believe the witness’s 
explanation or to believe the prior statements as it is to assess the trial 
testimony.  The trier would also be able to consider whether bias (the desire 
to keep a job) might affect the trial testimony.  Thus, the one scenario in 
which prior inconsistent statements should be admissible as substantive 
evidence is this one.  It is truly a case, in the words of the original Advisory 
Committee, where “[t]he declarant is in court and may be examined and 
cross-examined in regard to his statements and their subject matter.”18 
I would say the same if the interview had been tape-recorded, or if a 
lengthy statement had been signed by the witness, because the trier of fact 
would have a substantial basis to evaluate the circumstances in which the 
statement was made—because the witness, the agent, or both would lay a 
sufficient foundation for such evaluation. 
B.  A Twist:  The Witness Denies Making a Statement 
An altogether different scenario is one in which a witness is called to 
testify that a defendant distributed an illegal narcotic to the witness, and the 
following testimony occurs on direct examination: 
P:  Do you recall receiving methamphetamine from the defendant on  
  three occasions? 
W: No, I never received methamphetamine from the defendant. 
P:  Do you recall meeting with an FBI agent about a year ago? 
W: An agent came to see me.  I wouldn’t speak to her. 
 
 18. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A) advisory committee’s note to 1972 proposed rules. 
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P:  You deny speaking to Agent Jones? 
W: Yes. 
P:  You also deny telling her you received methamphetamine from the  
  defendant on three occasions? 
W: Yes, I most certainly do. 
In this scenario, admitting Agent Jones’s testimony about a prior 
statement by the witness as substantive evidence is unwarranted; it is not a 
case where “[t]he declarant is in court and may be examined and cross-
examined in regard to his statements and their subject matter.”19  There is 
nothing to cross-examine the declarant about from the defense point of 
view.  No defense lawyer is going to ask the witness anything more than to 
repeat the denial of making a statement.  There is no opportunity to 
examine the statement; the witness denies there was one. 
The alleged statement is one made by a witness who, according to the 
government, is lying on the witness stand and thus lacks credibility, and 
there are insufficient circumstances surrounding the alleged statement to 
warrant treating it as substantive evidence. 
The original Advisory Committee suggested that “[t]he trier of fact has 
the declarant before it and can observe his demeanor and the nature of his 
testimony as he denies or tries to explain away the inconsistency.”20  But, 
the brief nature of the examination of the witness offers little opportunity 
for observing anything that would be useful in determining credibility. 
C.  Another Twist:  “I Don’t Remember” 
If the witness does not deny a prior statement but instead says he does 
not remember it, what then?  The testimony goes like this: 
P:  Do you recall receiving methamphetamine from the defendant on  
   three occasions? 
W: No, I never received methamphetamine from the defendant. 
P:  Do you recall meeting with an FBI agent about a year ago? 
W: I don’t remember any such meeting. 
P:  You deny there was a meeting with Agent Jones? 
W: I don’t remember any such meeting. 
P:  Do you remember telling her you received methamphetamine from  
   the defendant on three occasions? 
W: I have no memory of meeting with Agent Jones or speaking with any  
   agent. 
What is the defendant supposed to do by way of cross-examination?  The 
witness might be pretending not to remember, but there is nothing the 
defense can do about that.  And there is nothing on which to cross-examine 
the witness.  It is as bad from the defense perspective as when the witness 
simply denies making a prior inconsistent statement. 
 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
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D.  Rule 801(d)(1)(A) 
It is the rare witness who will deny making a statement when it was made 
under oath in a proceeding and there is a formal record of the statement.  A 
denial might be prosecuted as perjury.  Thus, the problem of denial is 
unlikely to occur.  Instead, the witness usually will testify and offer a reason 
for the prior statement so that the trier of fact is well situated to evaluate the 
prior statement in light of the witness’s explanation. 
Even if the witness claims a memory problem, there will be substantial 
foundation as to the circumstances in which the prior inconsistent statement 
was made.  If one believes that reliability is the only rationale for a hearsay 
exception or exemption, Professor Capra is correct in arguing that “[t]he 
requirements imposed by Congress in Rule 801(d)(1)(A) have little to do 
with the concerns that are at the heart of the hearsay rule.”21  But, if one 
accepts my thesis that we create hearsay exceptions pursuant to which the 
proponent of the hearsay must lay a sufficient foundation to enable a trier of 
fact to make an adequate assessment of its value, then Rule 801(d)(1)(A) is 
a reasonable, justifiable compromise. 
IV.  MISTAKES AND THE BALANCE OF ADVANTAGE 
The argument has been made that a danger of admitting prior inconsistent 
statements as substantive evidence is that when witnesses are impeached by 
third party testimony as to their prior statements, the third parties might 
have misheard or misunderstood the prior statements.22  This is not an 
argument that I make in favor of excluding prior inconsistent statements as 
substantive evidence.  There is no a priori reason to believe that witnesses 
who hear things are more likely to mistake them than witnesses who see 
things, and there are good reasons to believe that witnesses will pay careful 
attention to what is said in many circumstances. 
There is, however, a concern about who benefits from an approach that 
admits all prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence.  My belief 
is that the government will benefit more in criminal cases than will any 
other class of litigants.  The reason is that law enforcement officers will 
typically testify to establish that prior inconsistent statements were in fact 
made after trial witnesses either deny or do not recall making them.  Juries 
are likely in my experience to pay special attention to the testimony of law 
enforcement officers and are more likely to believe their testimony than 
they are to believe testimony of ordinary witnesses who claim to have heard 
prior inconsistent statements.  Yet, the reality is that when impeached 
witnesses deny making prior inconsistent statements or claim not to 
remember them, defense counsel are effectively disabled from effective 
cross-examination, and there is no way for a jury to assess the reliability of 
the statements. 
 
 21. See Capra Note, supra note 16. 
 22. This is well repudiated by Professor Capra. See Capra Note, supra note 16. 
2016] RULE 801(D)(1)(A):  THE COMPROMISE  1507 
It is true, of course, that defendants in criminal cases and all civil litigants 
could offer prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence if a 
California-type approach were adopted.  But, I do not believe that prior 
inconsistent statements reported by typical third parties are likely to have 
the same effect as those reported by law enforcement officers testifying for 
the prosecution in criminal cases.  The California approach is likely to tilt 
the balance of advantage in favor of the government, and I see no reason to 
do that.23 
CONCLUSION 
Rule 801(d)(1)(A) is a compromise that is consistent with the theory of 
hearsay.  It admits prior inconsistent statements in circumstances in which a 
trial witness is unlikely to deny making a prior inconsistent statement, a 
jury is likely to understand the circumstances in which the prior statement 
was made, and there is reason to believe that the jury can fairly evaluate the 
reliability of the prior statement.  There is a good case to be made for also 
admitting as substantive evidence prior inconsistent statements when a 
witness acknowledges making such statements and can be examined on the 
circumstances in which they were made. 
The exclusion as substantive evidence of prior statements not made under 
oath in a proceeding is a recognition of the practical problems with cross-
examining prior statements that witnesses either deny or claim not to 
remember.  Those practical problems existed at common law, and they 
continue to exist today. 
 
 23. There is some reason to believe that it is intended to do so.  As the original Advisory 
Committee observed, “Section 1235 will provide a party with desirable protection against 
the ‘turncoat’ witness who changes his story on the stand and deprives the party calling him 
of evidence essential to his case.” See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A) advisory committee’s note 
to 1972 proposed rules (citing CAL. EVID. CODE § 1235 cmt.).  Although the observation 
could apply to all parties, it is a special concern of the government. 
